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ABSTRACT/SUMMARY 
 
The technology industry and even open source projects are heavily based on 
intellectual property rights, such as the copyright protection for software. In 
a rapidly changing technological and legal landscape, it can be difficult to 
find a proper balance between the enforcement of software copyright and 
alternative considerations such as safeguarding interoperability. This is 
illustrated by presenting and analysing cases from competition law and 
copyright law, with a focus on the abuse of a dominant position under 
Article 102 and the scope of protection of software under Directive 91/250. 
On this legal basis and supported by economic literature, the current 
situation and its development is presented, where market conditions that 
favour monopolies and inherent network-effects can present a challenge for 
interoperability, a concept that is instrumental for a functioning 
technological landscape, especially for Free and Open Source Software. 
While there are already some safeguards in place with regard to Directive 
91/250 as is shown by such cases as SAS or BSA, these leave a considerable 
degree of legal uncertainty. As such, especially with regard to the 
Commission’s plan to potentially legislate in this area based on Article 118 
TFEU as part of Agenda 2020 and the initiative for a single digital market, 
the concept of interoperability information should be safeguarded and 
recognized more expressly. 
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ACRONYMS / ABBREVIATIONS 
 
EU European Union 
EC European Commission 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
DG Comp Directorate General Competition of the EU 
Commission 
DG Connect Directorate General for the Digital Agenda of the EU 
Commission 
CFI Court of First Instance 
GC General Court 
TRIPS Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization 
FOSS Free and Open Source Software 
FLOSS Free, Libre and Open Source Software 
FSFE Free Software Foundation Europe 
GNU GNU is not Unix 
GPL General Public License 
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The concept of interoperability in European Union law – An analysis in 
competition law and intellectual property law (Business as usual or a never-
ending story in need of new regulation?) 
 
“The Commission should not need to run an epic antitrust case every time software 
lacks interoperability. Wouldn't it be nice to solve all such problems in one go?” 
 
-- Neelie Kroes, European Commission Vice-President for the Digital Agenda1 
 
§1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the concept of interoperability with regard to the 
competitive disadvantages, which software producers, specifically providers 
of free and open source software have to face when they need to ensure 
interoperability with an important or even dominant product to be 
competitive in the marketplace and a viable alternative for consumers. 
Instead of only examining this within the strict boundaries of competition 
law, the present examination explicitly includes the concept of 
interoperability as established in copyright case law and examines the role 
of standards as far as possible. 
 
1.1. Why is it relevant? 
 
Today there is a considerable market of products and services in the area of 
Free and Open Source software, in some areas with significant market 
share.2  As such, competition concerns in or on this market are important for 
the single (digital) market and interoperability is of particular importance for 
Free and Open Source Software.3 
                                                 
1 European Commission, ‘Neelie Kroes Address at Open Forum Europe 2010 Summit: 
Openness at the heart of the EU Digital Agenda’ (2010) accessed 21 May 2013. 
2 Marketshares and acceptance: Richard Kemp, ‘Current Developments in Open Source 
Software’ (2009) 25 Computer Law & Security Review 569. p. 570; 
3 Christian Hicks and Dessislava Pachamanova, ‘Back-propagation of user innovations: The 
open source compatibility edge’ (2007) 50 Business Horizons 315 accessed 29 September 
2012. p. 316. 
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Interoperability can be a key to healthy competition on a functioning 
software market, as this market has the potential for tremendous lock-in 
effects.4 This was the case in the past as the well-known cases in relation to 
Microsoft (T-201/04) and T-167/08 have shown.5 Even when just looking at 
Microsoft, though they are not as brazen as in the past, similar issues with 
potential competition concerns exist today, for example regarding secure 
boot.6  As a result, especially regarding the growing importance of the 
digital market, this is very much a current issue that should be considered, 
especially in light of the Commission’s push for a single digital market.7 
Free and Open Source software has been at the forefront of a ‘single market’ 
for software, always improving through continuous iteration and providing 
continuous innovation independent of proprietary product cycles, whether 
mainly developed in a community driven project or by a company.  
 
1.1. Table of Content 
 
The structure of the present analysis will start by presenting relevant 
background information and definitions that are important for the rest of the 
essay in part §2. There, software and free and open source software are 
defined as they are used within this document. Then, part §3 examines the 
various faces of interoperability, as defined by competition law, copyright 
law and when taking into account different kinds of standards. After that, in 
§4, the qualitative case law analysis is conducted using signature cases 
according to the criteria established above. During §5, the literature review 
is conducted. In §6, the analysis that came before is supplemented by 
economic data that evaluates the economic cost of lock-in or lack of 
interoperability. Finally, in §7 a normative view is outlined on the possible 
                                                 
4 Lock-in effects describe the effect or fear of an effect that would ‘lock’ an individual or an 
entity to a particular product, vendor or service because it could not chose another without 
significant costs that arise of the incompatibility of the current product vendor or service 
with potential alternatives. 
5 Chapter 4.2; 
6 Chapter. 4.5; 
7 Communication regarding A Digital Agenda for Europe 26 August 2010, COM(2010) 245 
final/2 (European Commission). p. 14; Pursuant to the schedule therein and the E-Mail in 
Appendix A, a staff working document should be forthcoming. 
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future development of the concept of interoperability in European Union 
law and in §8 a conclusion is drawn. 
 
 
1.2. Scope 
 
To define a broader concept of interoperability that covers more than one 
strictly defined discipline, the concept of interoperability will be examined 
in the areas of European Union Competition Law and Intellectual Property 
Law, most importantly the relevant statutes and case law, but also through 
existing scholarship. Furthermore the issue of (dominant) standards as far as 
they pertain to the areas under examination and the concept of 
interoperability will be examined. Reference to case law or legal provisions 
of member states of the European Union will be made, where this is 
necessary to describe a case or legislation at the level of the European 
Union. The territorial scope will be restricted to the geographic area of the 
European Union. 
 
1.3. Case Selection 
 
If past cases are taken as an example, most interoperability issues because of 
dominant software firms have taken place at the EU level, or were referred 
to the European Union. Additionally, it should be distinguished between the 
European Union level and the ‘International Intellectual Property Regime’, 
as intellectual property rights are moving slowly but surely to regulation at 
the European Union level instead of being regulated by each individual 
member state, especially with regard to the establishment of a single digital 
market within the European Union.8 This is even more so since the 
establishment of Article 118 TFEU, which now allows for harmonization in 
this area. Thus, the focus will be on the European Union level. Due to its 
general importance in intellectual property matters, reference will be made 
to the US system and its litigation where appropriate. 
                                                 
8 ibid. 
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Furthermore, cases will be selected from the area of competition law, the 
area of intellectual property law and the field of regulation surrounding 
technical standards. Regarding standards it will be distinguished between 
proprietary, open, and quasi-standards. 
In the area of competition law, the main focus will be on case T-201/04 
(Microsoft, Workgroup Servers) and its recent conclusion regarding the fine 
in T-167/08.9 
Regarding the area of copyright law, Case C-406/10 SAS Institute v World 
Programming Ltd. will be examined, with references to the referring and the 
concluding case at the English High Court where appropriate.10 
For the literature review, a host of literature was selected that explores the 
relation between proprietary and free and open source software using 
economic and socio-legal means. Most important in this regard due to the 
economic nature of competition and intellectual property law is the work by 
Elkin-Koren, Bitzer, Goode, Lanzi, Lin and Hicks.11 
This is then complemented by literature about free and open source software 
in a general legal context such as the excellent handbook by Jaeger/Metzger 
and reference to the work of Guibault and van Daalen about Open Source 
Licenses from a Dutch and European Law perspective as well as shorter 
                                                 
9 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding unter Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) 24 March 2004 (Commission of the 
European Communities).; Microsoft v Commission [2007] T-204/01, [2007] II-03601 
(Court of First Instance).; Microsoft v Commission [2012] T-167/08, [2012] nyp. (Court of 
First Instance). 
10 SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd. (2012) C-406/10 nyp. (Court of Justice of 
the European Union).; SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd. [2010] EWHC 1829, 
[2010] (High Court, Chancery Division).; SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd 
[2013] EWHC 69, [2013] (High Court, Chancery Division). 
11 Niva Elkin-Koren and Eli M Salzberger, The law and economics of intellectual property 
in the digital age: The limits of analysis (Routledge research in intellectual property vol 5, 
Routledge 2013).; Jürgen Bitzer, ‘Commercial versus open source software: the role of 
product heterogeneity in competition’ (2004) 28 Economic Systems 369 accessed 29 
September 2012.; Sigi Goode, ‘Something for nothing: management rejection of open 
source software in Australia’s top firms’ (2005) 42 Information & Management 669 
<http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0378720604000783/1-s2.0-S0378720604000783-
main.pdf?_tid=8ca06f96-0a34-11e2-abb8-
00000aacb35f&acdnat=1348923338_875933f5cb8e30ea1a22cfdc2e53069d> accessed 29 
September 2012.; Diego Lanzi, ‘Competition and open source with perfect software 
compatibility’ (2009) 21 Information Economics and Policy 192 accessed 29 September 
2012.; Lihui Lin, ‘Impact of user skills and network effects on the competition between 
open source and proprietary software’ (2008) 7 Electronic Commerce Research and 
Applications 68 accessed 29 September 2012.; Hicks and Pachamanova (n 3). 
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essays about the topic by Kemp and Henley.12 Where relevant, during the 
analysis or the examination of the case law, relevant commentary and 
doctrine will be referenced such as essays about the cases by Komninos & 
Czapracka, Glorioso, Kühn, Hoehn, Barazza and Kalmo13 as well as 
legislative commentary by Vinje.14 
 
1.4. Method 
 
First, a qualitative case law analysis with signature cases in the areas of 
competition law (abuse of a dominant position to the disadvantage of 
interoperability), the area of copyright (use of copyright to defeat 
interoperability) is conducted. 
Secondly, a review of commentary and economic literature is conducted to 
solidify the case law analysis in this paper and to supplement the analysis 
conducted with the scholarship of past and present researchers.15 When 
examining the economic literature special emphasis is put on economic data 
                                                 
12 Till Jaeger and Axel Metzger, Open Source Software: Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen 
der freien Software (3rd edn, Beck 2011).; Lucie Guibault and Ot van Daalen, Unravelling 
the myth around open source licenses: An analysis from a dutch and european law 
perspective (TMC Asser Press 2005).; Kemp (n 2).; Mark Henley and Richard Kemp, 
‘Open Source Software: An introduction’ (2008) 24 Computer Law & Security Report 77 
accessed 29 September 2012. 
13 Assimakis P Komninos and Katarzyna A Czapracka, ‘IP Rights in the EU Microsoft 
Saga’ in Etro Federico and Ioannis Kokkoris (eds), Competition law and the enforcement of 
article 102 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).; Andrea Glorioso, ‘An interoperable world: the 
European Commission vs Microsoft Corporation and the value of open interfaces’ (2005) 
<http://www.bileta.ac.uk/content/files/conference%20papers/2005/An%20Interoperable%2
0World%20-
%20the%20European%20Commission%20vs%20Microsoft%20Corporation%20and%20th
e%20Value%20of%20Open%20Interfaces.pdf> accessed 4 May 2013.; Kai-Uwe Kühn and 
John van Reenen, ‘Interoperability and Market Foreclosure in the European Microsoft 
Case’ in B. Lyons (ed), Cases in European Competition Policy: The Economic Analysis 
(Cambridge University Press 2007).; Thomas Hoehn and Alex Lewis, ‘Interoperability 
remedies and innovation: a review of recent case law’ (12 March 2012) accessed 22 March 
2013.; Stefano Barazza, ‘Commission v Microsoft: How to Set Reasonable Rates for 
Access to Interoperability Information and Evaluate their Innovative Character?’ (2013) 4 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 52 accessed 22 March 2013.; Hent 
Kalmo and Alessandro Scopelliti, ‘Microsoft Europe Case: The Refusal to supply 
interoperability’ (Catania 6 July 2009) accessed 24 March 2013. 
14 Thomas C Vinje, ‘Die EG-Richtlinie zum Schutz von Computerprogrammen und die 
Frage der Interoperabilität’ (1992) 1992 Zeitschrift der Deutschen Gesellschaft für 
Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht (GRUR Int) 250 accessed 4 May 2013. 
15 For the literature selected, see above. 
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pertaining to the costs of switching (sunk costs) due to network effects in 
the software market and the market structure of the software market.16 
Finally, a normative analysis on the importance of interoperability is 
presented, drawing on the case  law that was analysed as well as existing 
scholarship and commentary. 
 
1.5. Outcome 
 
This paper establishes a more comprehensive concept of interoperability 
spanning competition law and intellectual property law, using legal and 
economic data sources.  
To this end, the current situation in respect to European Union legislation 
and relevant case law from competition law and software copyright law is 
presented, which already features exemptions and recognizes the need for 
interoperability. Due to the network effects and the structure of the 
technology market however, it is argued that more legal certainty and 
greater recognition of interoperability for example through the requirement 
of open-standards could be beneficial. Not only for free and open source 
software but for the single (digital) market as a whole, as there are 
indications that otherwise small, innovative enterprises are much more 
likely to join an existing incumbent as soon as possible out of fear of too 
strict intellectual property enforcement.17 This would only make existing 
incumbents and their intellectual portfolios stronger, and is more likely to 
lead to competition concerns in the future. 
 
§2. Background 
 
2.1. Computer Basics 
 
                                                 
16 Bitzer (n 11).; Goode (n 11).; Lanzi (n 11).; Lin (n 11).; Hicks and Pachamanova (n 3). 
17 Joshua S Gans and Lars Persson, ‘Entrepreneurial Commercialization Choices and the 
Interaction between IPR and Competition Policy’ (2012). Working Papers 16 accessed 10 
May 2013. 
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When developing computer programs, this happens in one or more of a 
multitude of programming languages.18 These are human-readable 
instructions with a very specific syntax and format. These instructions are 
written to a text file, where together, they constitute ‘source code’. This 
source code is then turned into ‘object code’ which is what the computer can 
actually understand and execute, consisting of 0s and 1s or a precursor-
format.  This conversion process is called ‘compilation’ and the program 
that performs this, is called a ‘compiler’. The reverse process, relevant in the 
context of the exmeptions in Directive 91/250 is called ‘decompilation’ 
though it generally only manages to return a crude image of what the 
original source code looked like.19 
 
2.2. Software in law20 
 
How software is defined in law depends on the circumstances of a case or 
the legislation in which it is used. Below the main sources applicable in the 
European legal framework will be described. 
On the international level, three agreements are in place, that affect 
copyright law in the member states of the European Union and the Union 
itself. While in front of a court parties seldom are able to rely directly on an 
international copyright treaty, they can be used to guide the judges and other 
authorities when interpreting relevant national or supra-national law.21 
First, under the all-encompassing, but vague Article 2 of the Berne 
Convention, the protection of software is subsumed under the protection of 
all ‘literary and artistic works’, independent of their form.22 Secondly, under 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) clarifies in Article 10 that computer programs are protected as 
                                                 
18 Guibault and van Daalen (n 12). p. 6-7. 
19 Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer programs 17 May 1991, OJ L 
122 (Council of the European Communities).; 
20 Axel H Horns, ‘Anmerkungen zu begrifflichen Fragen des Softwareschutzes’ (2001) 
2001 Zeitschrift der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und 
Urheberrecht (GRUR) 1 accessed 4 May 2013; Jaeger and Metzger (n 12); Vinje (n 14). 
21 SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd. (n 10). para. 33-34. 
22 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 28 September 1979. 
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literary works under the Berne convention.23 Thirdly, pursuant to Article 4 
of the World Intellectual Property organisation (WIPO) Copyright Treaty 
computer programs are also protected as literary works within the meaning 
of the Berne Convention.24 Thus while the Berne Convention itself is not 
clear on this, the TRIPS agreement and the WIPO Treaty which are in force 
with regard to European Union law, specify that computer programs are 
protected within the scope of literary works as well. This should also be the 
case in most member states, although a discussion of that would go beyond 
the scope of this work. 
Crucially, both the TRIPS agreement and the WIPO Treaty specify that 
“Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, 
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such” with 
almost identical wording.25 
On the European level, there are so far mainly two Directives applicable to 
the copyright protection of software. This is firstly the Directive 91/25026 
about the copyright protection of computer programs and Directive 2001/29, 
also known as the Information Society Directive.27 
In Directive 91/250, ‘computer programs’ are then defined in Recital 7 as  
 
“programs in any form, including those which are incorporated into 
hardware; … this term also includes preparatory design work leading to 
the development of a computer program, provided that the nature of the 
preparatory work is such that a computer program can result from it at a 
later stage;”28 
 
                                                 
23 ‘Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: TRIPS’, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1994).; Jaeger and 
Metzger (n 12). p. 291. 
24 Art. 4 WIPO Copyright Treaty 
25 ‘Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (n 23). Art. 9; 
WIPO Copyright Treaty 20 December 1996 (WTO). Art. 2. 
26 It should be noted, that in 2009 the newer Directive 2009/24/EC regarding the protection 
of computer programs was put into force, but as it is not referred to in any case law so far, 
did not introduce significant changed and has not been transposed, the name of the old 
Directive is still used. 
27 Jaeger and Metzger (n 12). p. 105, 291; Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 22 May 2001 (The 
European Parliament and the Council). 
28 Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer programs (n 19). Rec. 7. 
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In the body of the Directive, this is embodied within Article 1, where the 
object of the protection is defined.29 
Furthermore, recital 14 clarifies in accordance with the applicable copyright 
treaties, ideas and principles are not protected under this Directive, though 
they might be protected under other legislation.30 
Subsequently, in Article 4 in conjunction with the other applicable 
provisions and Treaties mentioned above, reproduction is and other 
modifications are largely reserved for the rights holder. Article 5 only 
excludes all those acts from the exclusive protection that are necessary to 
make normal use of the computer program. This includes for example 
copies that are made in runtime memory (for example: Random Access 
Memory, RAM) or when the program is set up or backed up.31 
Most importantly however, Article 6 of Directive 91/250 allows for certain, 
otherwise prohibited acts if their purpose is to achieve interoperability in 
Article 6 (1) a-c. At least in the English version, the precise interpretation is 
not clear. In Article 6 (2) a-c, it is said that the thusly obtained information 
may not be used for goals other than achieving interoperability and may not 
be given to others except for achieving interoperability (for which it has to 
be passed on as part of the program). Furthermore it is not to be used for the 
“development, production or marketing of a program substantially similar in 
its expression”. This expression seems to be there to discourage 
interoperable programs, which in their expression are too close to the 
original program.32 By looking towards Vinje writing in 1991 extensively 
about the Software Directive, it can becomes clear that the intention of the 
legislator was, after fierce debate, to allow competing products.33 
Additionally with Article 6 (3) and Article 9 of the Directive, the legislation 
tried to combine the exceptions with the absolute protection articulated in 
the Berne Convention and the right protected by other intellectual property 
                                                 
29 ibid. Art. 1. 
30 ibid. Rec. 14. 
31 ibid. Art4+5; See as an example acts permitted under German Copyright law, which 
implements the Directives and is in compliance with the international treaties: Jaeger and 
Metzger (n 12). p. 110; Vinje (n 14). p. 254. 
32 Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer programs (n 19). Art. 6; Vinje 
(n 14). p. 255. 
33 ibid. p. 258. 
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rights such as patent rights, trade marks, unfair competition, trade secrets or 
contract  law.34 This seems to be merely a provision to appease however, if 
the SAS case is to seen as an example as will be shown later. Nonetheless, 
depending on the implementation in national law, companies which need to 
rely on it, or individual open-source developers, might be discouraged from 
developing innovative products as there is a high degree of legal uncertainty 
in those paragraphs with regard to what ‘unreasonably prejudices’ a rights 
holder or when or where exactly patent  rights or trade secrets would be 
infringed. This can be difficult to discern even for seasoned intellectual 
property lawyers.35 
The Commission gave a separate definition in its Decision C(2004)900, for 
the general subject matter of an abuse of a dominant position in the case and 
the description of which interoperability information, regarding which 
software interfaces and protocols were discussed.36 
There, software was described thusly: “…word software refers to the 
instructions that direct the hardware operations, also designated as computer 
programs.”37 This is as succinct and precise as it can get. 
 
2.3. F(L)OSS38 
 
Free and open source software as it is known today came into existence in 
the 80s when with the birth of the internet and the accompanying hacker and 
enthusiast movement, community-driven, networked development of 
software became possible.39 
Since Richard Stallman and his Free Software Foundation (located in the 
US) then created the first version of the GNU (GNU is not Unix) GPL 
(GNU Public License), it has only become more and more popular, not only 
with enthusiasts and developers, but also with businesses and 
                                                 
34 Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer programs (n 19). Art. 6 & 9. 
35 Gans and Persson (n 17). p. 16. 
36 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding unter Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) (n 9). 
37 ibid. Rec. 21.  
38 Jaeger and Metzger (n 12).; Kemp (n 2).; Henley and Kemp (n 12). 
39 ibid. p. 77-78. 
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governments.40 Today, it exists in many forms and variations and because 
this work is about the concept of interoperability, which is especially 
important to Free and Open Source Software, its further inception, evolution 
and current state will be briefly outlined below. 
 
The terminology in this area is actually more complicated than it might 
seem, as terms such as ‘free’ or ‘open’ have different meanings depending 
on the context. The term ‘free software’ for example exists since the 80s, the 
often used phrase ‘Open Source Software’ however was only established in 
1998.41 
The first basic definition of free software was given by the (American) Free 
Software Foundation (FSF), which defines the liberties granted by and 
through free software licenses and summarizes them in the following, 
succinct phrase: 
 
“Free software is a matter of the users’ freedom to run, copy, 
distribute, study, change and improve the software.”42 
 
While the software doesn’t have to be provided for free, to qualify as free or 
open source software, re-distribution has to be allowed, the license must not 
discriminate who can use the software and most crucial of all, modifications 
have to be allowed. This means that the source code from which the 
software is assembled has to be distributed and either can be re-distributed 
itself or at the very least changes to the source code must be allowed to be 
redistributed.43 
The key difference to ‘normal’ proprietary software is hence in the explicit 
rights granted for (re-) distribution, modification, analysis and duplication. 
It should also be clarified that the all the aspects mentioned above do not 
mean, that no money can be charged by the creator, best put by the phrase 
that still holds high value in the relevant tech community: 
                                                 
40 Jaeger and Metzger (n 12). p. 42; Guibault and van Daalen (n 12). p. 8.;ibid. p. 1; Hicks 
and Pachamanova (n 3). p. 315. 
41 Jaeger and Metzger (n 12). p. 1-2; 
42 ibid. p. 1-2; 
43 ibid. p. 2;  
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 “Free in the sense of free speech, not in the sense of free 
beer”44 
 
In the French speaking community, this is expressed through the term 
‘logiciel libre’ which led the European Union to propose the use of the 
acronym ‘FLOSS’, Free, libre and open source software.45 
For ‘non-free’ software, generally the term ‘proprietary software’ is used, 
though it is not perfectly accurate, as the license through which the rights 
for modification and distribution are granted and enforced are based on the 
normal intellectual property rights.46 
 
To make the new development model more palatable to businesses (which 
had an aversion to the sound of ‘free’) the ‘Open Source Initiative’ was 
founded and from that point onwards many people chose to adopt the 
expression ‘Open Source Software’ instead.47 This worked wonders for 
acceptance in the business world, with such companies as IBM, Sun und 
Oracle. 48 
 
2.3.1.1. The viral effect (copy-left/non-copy left)49 
  
Despite the basic elements that all open source licenses have in common, 
significant differences between them do exist. Most importantly, licenses 
are categorized depending on whether they are ‘copyleft’ or ‘non-copyleft’.  
Copyleft refers to specific protection clauses used in many open source 
licenses, that require modifications of open-source software to be published 
under the same conditions as the original.50 The most widely used examples 
of a copy-left license is the GPL (GNU Public License) in its three versions. 
                                                 
44 ibid. p. 3. 
45 ibid. p. 3. 
46 Guibault and van Daalen (n 12). p. 36. 
47 ibid. p. 12. 
48 Jaeger and Metzger (n 12). p. 4. 
49 Guibault and van Daalen (n 12). p. 51; Jaeger and Metzger (n 12). p. 4; Henley and 
Kemp (n 12). p. 79. 
50 Guibault and van Daalen (n 12). ; Jaeger and Metzger (n 12). 
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Together, version 2 and 3 cover more than one third of open source 
projects.51 This is often also described as ‘reciprocal’ or ‘viral’ as it can 
have the effect of forcing these license obligations on programs or parts of a 
program or software system that  code published under such a license is 
incorporated into. This helped a great deal to keep certain important open-
source projects open, through requiring improvement to be made public if 
distributed, which in return served to strengthen the ideological ground from 
which they came. 
Non-copy left or weak-copy left licenses do not include any protection 
clause at all (BSD-style licenses) or only a weak one such as the Mozilla 
Public License (MPL).52 
 
2.4. Interface competition law / IP53 
 
The issue of the inter-relationship between competition law (enabling 
market entry, protecting competition) and copyright law (protection of a 
company’s investment, exclusive rights) as raised for example in the 
Microsoft case is still very present today. In a recent working paper by the 
Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum, it was shown that in case of very strict 
copyright protection and enforcement, upcoming entrepreneurs are more 
prone to work under the umbrella of big incumbents, instead of competing 
with them.54 This shows that strong copyright enforcement is not always 
beneficial, but can in fact be counter-effective to innovation. Along this line 
of reasoning, Wielsch describes that curing the extension of copyright onto 
information that maybe should have no or no absolute copyright protection 
such as the TV listings in Magill (see below) can be seen as an external 
correction through competition law.55 
 
                                                 
51 Black Duck Software, ‘Open Source License Data: Top 20 Most Commonly Used 
Licenses in Open Source Projects’ (2013) 
<http://osrc.blackducksoftware.com/data/licenses/>.; Guibault and van Daalen (n 12). p. 8. 
52 Jaeger and Metzger (n 12). p. 4-5; Guibault and van Daalen (n 12). p. 10-11. 
53 Dan Wielsch, ‘Wettbewerbsrecht als Immaterialgüterrecht’ (2005) 2005 Europäische 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 391 accessed 4 May 2013. 
54 Gans and Persson (n 17). p. 16. 
55 Wielsch (n 53). p. 392. 
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§3. The multiple legal and technical faces of interoperability56 
 
The concept of interoperability can be different depending on the context in 
which it is used. In the Microsoft saga and in literature it was described as a 
matter of degree.57 In so far the Commission and Microsoft even agreed, 
although it didn’t help Microsoft in the end. 
Here, a differentiation is made between the context of competition law, the 
context of copyright law and the role of standards.58 Independent of the 
legal context in which it is used, interoperability or the information required 
therefore is to some degree always required when different software 
products communicate either on the same computer or between computers 
exchanges some form of information. The information exchange happens 
through ‘interfaces’ which can be either material or immaterial connections 
between hardware or software.59 This can for example be communication 
between computers, but also includes file formats or data structures. In any 
case, it is of special importance to Free and Open Source Software60, as it 
not only relies on it but also historically it was and still is a goal of many 
open source projects to be as interoperable as possible, to make the most use 
of the program and the computer it runs on.  
Pursuant to Hicks, interoperability is a part of compatibility, although for 
the purpose of this paper they will be used interchangeably because as far as 
software goes, interoperability all that is needed to achieve maximum 
compatibility. 
 
3.1. A historical example of necessitated interoperability in the case of 
computer programs 
 
                                                 
56 Vinje (n 14).; Kühn and van Reenen (n 13). p. 12. 
57 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding unter Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) (n 9). Rec. 33. 
58 Standards cannot be discussed in detail due to space and time constraints, but are 
mentioned as they are very relevant. 
59 Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer programs (n 19). Preamble. 
60 Hicks and Pachamanova (n 3). p. 316. 
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In his essay about Directive gives a good example about the importance of 
interoperability in the software market, independent of the involvement of 
Free and Open Source Software.61 In 1982, IBM introduced the IBM PC. 
Though at the time competing products still existed, it soon became the 
dominant product and network effects reinforced this trend.62 Soon, this 
force competing hardware vendors to emulate the IBM Bios, a small 
program also called ‘firmware’ that sits close to the hardware and initialize 
it when starting the computer.63 This was further reinforced by popular 
application programs that required access to the ‘Bios’ directly instead of 
through Microsoft’s operating system as that intermediated access was too 
slow. 
As a consequence, without having access to the source code of the Bios, 
these companies developed an independent firmware program, compatible 
with their hardware and acting the same way as an IBM Bios. This use is a 
good example of interoperable use, and would pursuant to Vinje also be 
covered under Directive 91/250. For this it was important that ‘function’ 
and through that ideas or processes were not protected as it had been 
discussed during the discussion about the Directive, as then a fully 
interoperable IBM Bios would have been impossible.64 The author also 
already concluded that if necessary, certain minimal pieces of source code 
were allowed to be copied if necessary, such as when an early version of 
Microsoft Word looked for the word ‘IBM’ in the copyright notice of a 
graphics adapter firmware and if it was there turned on advanced 
capabilities, so competitors had to include a notice that said ‘IBM’ as well. 
Such minimal use of certain word should not be an issue anymore by a long 
shot, if the SAS case is any indication. 
 
3.2. Interoperability from a competition law point of view65 
 
                                                 
61 Vinje (n 14). 
62 ibid. p. 251. 
63 ibid. p. 252. 
64 ibid. p. 255-256. 
65 Kalmo and Scopelliti (n 13).; Glorioso (n 13).; Kühn and van Reenen (n 13). 
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In the area of competition law, interoperability between systems, or more 
accurately the availability of ‘interoperability information’ is an issue in 
cases where under a specific market definition, a company has a dominant 
position or in any case a market share that is such as to create adverse, self-
strengthening effects for competing companies that continuously strengthen 
the dominant position.66 This results in a situation where a product by a 
competitor cannot be made reasonably compatible or interoperable with 
readily available information.67 This then serves to strengthen the position 
of the already dominant product or company, as consumers will either have 
high costs in time or labour or even accept data loss if converting data is not 
possible by reasonable means.68 
In the ambit of the Microsoft Case (Workgroup Servers) Interoperability 
Information was defined by reference to the preambles of the ‘Software 
Directive’, Council Directive 91/250/EEC, which states: 
 
“Whereas the function of a computer program is to 
communicate and work together with other components of a 
computer system and with users and, for this purpose a logical 
and, where appropriate, physical interconnection and 
interaction is required to permit all elements of software and 
hardware to work with other software and hardware and with 
users in all the ways in which they are intended to function; 
 
Whereas the parts of the program which provide for such 
interconnection and interaction between elements of software 
and hardware are generally known as interfaces; 
 
Whereas this functional interconnection and interaction is 
generally known as interoperability; whereas such 
interoperability can be defined as the ability to exchange 
                                                 
66 Komninos and Czapracka (n 13). p. 96; Kalmo and Scopelliti (n 13). p. 4-5. 
67 Hoehn and Lewis (n 13). p. 2-4. 
68 ibid. p. 2-4. 
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information and mutually to use the information which has 
been exchanged.”69 
 
While Microsoft argued that the ‘concept of full interoperability’ was 
beyond the meaning enunciated in the Directive, in the end this argument 
did not find favour with the court.70 
On a legal basis, competition law issues with regard to interoperability can 
arise when a dominant undertaking abuses its dominant position such as in 
the Microsoft case (Article 102 TFEU), merger control or potentially a 
coordinated refusal by a group of undertakings could also constitute an 
infringement under Article 101 or 102.71 The Microsoft case about work 
group servers was the first where it was shown on a legal level that 
interoperability is an important concept and that the release of compatibility 
information can be enforced. Independent of the prevalence of 
interoperability problems, the use of competition law to get a remedy will 
only be available in the most serious of cases. To this end Wielsch argued 
very convincingly in 2005 that competition law can serve as regulation of 
intellectual property law, so that Article 6 of Directive 91/250 about 
decompilation could even serve as a justification for competition law 
interference, to insure that the copyright is not abused.72 
 
 
3.3. Lock-in73 
 
In regard to the concept of interoperability in the software market, lock-in 
refers to technical and administrative measures, which make switching to a 
different software or software service very cost-intensive or impossible.74 
                                                 
69 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding unter Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) (n 9)., Preamble. 
70 ibid. 
71 Hoehn and Lewis (n 13). p. 2-4. 
72 Wielsch (n 53). p. 392. 
73 S. J Liebowitz and S. E Margolis, ‘The Troubled Path of the Lock-In Movement’ (2013) 
9 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 125 accessed 22 March 2013.; R. Polk 
Wagner, ‘Information wants to be free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of 
Control’ accessed 22 March 2013. 
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This is for example the case, if a consumer or company cannot migrate to a 
new system piece by piece, as it could if the competitor can achieve full 
interoperability with the competing system, or if it cannot easily convert 
existing data structures to a new program because of proprietary formats and 
lack of documentation and other interoperability information. In such a case, 
where manual conversion of data or a custom-built solution would be 
necessary, a developer of a competing product would have a hard time 
convincing potential customers to change, independent of how great his 
product is otherwise. This is even more of an issue with the rise of DRM 
(Digital-Rights-Management) in an attempt to apply tighter restrictions on 
works than is given by the law.75 
Additionally, a similar problem is presented below when looking at 
interoperability from a copyright perspective. 
 
3.4. Interoperability from a copyright point of view76 
 
Interoperability from a copyright point of view is most prevalent, when an 
interoperable program is implemented without access to the source code of 
the software that interoperability should be ensured with. 
Thus was the case in SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd77, where 
after a reference from the High Court of England and Wales, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union ruled that the copyright by the SAS Institute 
did not cover the functionality, the programming language or the data 
format used.78 
The outcome of this case is especially relevant to open source products, as 
they frequently need to implement functionality, language compatibility or 
data formats derived from observing a program while running in 
conjunction with what limited information is available to ensure 
                                                                                                                            
74 Kühn and van Reenen (n 13). p. 15 
75 Elkin-Koren and Salzberger (n 11). p. 204-205. 
76 Vinje (n 14). 
77 SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd. (n 10). 
78 ibid. 
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compatibility with commercial products or free and open source products 
with incompatible licenses.79 
 
3.5. The issue with standards80 
 
When examining the fringe between competition law and intellectual 
property law, the issue of standards has to be mentioned. While this can 
only be done to a limited extent within the scope of this work, it has to be 
addressed. 
‘Standards’ might seem like an easy solution to interoperability, but this 
depends very much on ones understanding of standards. Standards as such 
are not always suited to achieve interoperability, as they can be proprietary 
standards or encumbered by patents, which can make them unfeasible to 
implement for small, innovative companies or free and open source projects. 
In some cases it can also be observed that multiple technology companies or 
groups of companies are actually competing to influence the standards 
setting process, because if their favoured standard ‘wins’ they stand to gain 
a lot in royalty payments.81 Similarly, ‘Quasi-Standards’ are proprietary or 
mostly proprietary developments that have, through market dynamics 
become ‘the standard’ just by almost everybody using it.82 
One solution could be ‘Open Standards’ though depending on where or by 
whom this word is used, it could have different meanings. Pursuant to 
Glorioso in 2005, who relies on Perens and his definition of Open 
Standards, the main elements of an Open Standard are availability, 
maximization of end-user choice, no royalty fee and extension or 
                                                 
79 Jaeger and Metzger (n 12). p. 97-100. 
80 European Committee for Interoperable Systems, ‘Interoperability & Open Standards | 
ECIS’  <http://www.ecis.eu/open-standards/> accessed 22 May 2013.; Stanley M Besen 
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 25
implementation of a subset should be allowed, while predatory extension 
should be prohibited. An example of predatory extension would be 
Microsoft’s use of ‘Kerberos’ in Windows 2000.83 
 
§4. Case law analysis 
 
For the main part of this work, relevant cases that are related to 
interoperability will be discussed below. They are discussed in a 
chronological order, which does not necessarily reflect their importance. 
 
4.1. Magill84 
 
The Magill case, although not related to software, was the first significant 
case where the relationship between copyrighted information and 
competition law was under consideration.85  
 
The facts concerned copyrighted information regarding the listings of TV 
broadcasters and their publication by an independent publisher (Magill). 
Magill set out to publish weekly TV listings, as until that time, none were 
available, the TV stations would only give a license to newspapers and 
similar outfits to publish the listings for the next day, under certain 
conditions. This license was granted free of charge, but they did not want to 
grant a license to Magill and did not want weekly listings.86 
                                                 
83 Glorioso (n 13). p. 13. 
84 Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Indenpendet Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v 
Commission (Magill) (2011) C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P 1995 I-00743 (CJEU).; Karl H 
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85 ibid. p. 955. 
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Commission (Magill) (n 84). Rec. 9; Pilny (n 84). p. 955. 
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Magill then filed a complaint with the Commission pursuant to Article 3 of 
Regulation 17, alleging that applicants used their dominant position to 
refuse supply under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty.87 
At the Court of First Instance, applicants were unsuccessful; their 
application for annulment of the Commission’s decision was dismissed. At 
the Court of Justice, the applicants achieved at least interim relief. 
The Court of First Instance had held, that there was an abuse of a dominant 
position, because although the defendants copyright in its own program 
listing in principle does allow it to control reproduction, this has to be 
restricted if the copyright is exercised in such a way as to be manifestly 
opposed to Article 86 EEC.88 
The Court of Justice then on 6th of April 1995, in its own analysis held that 
although an intellectual property right in itself cannot amount to a dominant 
position, the nature of the program broadcasters setting their own programs 
did constitute a dominant position.89 
As to the abuse of this dominant position, the Court of Justice held that 
contrary to the Appellants opinion, exercising the rights associated with an 
intellectual property right could, in certain circumstances amount to an 
infringement of competition law.90 
In the present case, the refusal by the applicants gave viewers no choice but 
to obtain the weekly schedule from each station separately and segregated 
the market for weekly listings to the applicants’ themselves. 
Furthermore, the court held trade between member states to be affected,  as 
TV programmes and the corresponding listings by the stations were 
published in Ireland as well as the parts of the United Kingdom, so that they 
had the potential to affect trade between Member States.91 
                                                 
87 Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Indenpendet Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v 
Commission (Magill) (n 84). Rec. 11; Pilny (n 84). p. 956. 
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The Court of Justice also had to evaluate whether Article 9 of the Berne 
Convention granting exclusive rights of reproduction was infringed by the 
Commission decision or the judgement by the Court of First Instance. In the 
end, the Court of Justice held that even if the Convention would have to be 
interpreted in the way applicant’s suggest, it is not applicable here, because 
no third country rights had been infringed making the old version not 
applicable as it had been signed pre-accession pursuant to Art. 234 EEC and 
the new one had been ratified by the UK only after accession and not yet at 
all by Ireland.92 
In the end, as stated above the case was dismissed entirely, the Court of 
Justice agreeing with the reasoning of the Commission, especially in so far 
as the actions by the applicants went beyond what would have been 
necessary to protect and properly exercise their copyright in the listing. 
Instead their conduct was held to be a business policy that was meant to 
protect their own business model to the detriment of competition on the 
market of weekly TV listings.93 
 
A short while later, a related case was judged in a similar way in Germany 
by the Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Upper Regional Court).94 That case, 
apart from being judged under national law and without any explicit 
reference to the Magill case mentioned above, was based on almost exactly 
the same set of facts. Only here, a TV broadcaster excluded one particular 
publisher from receiving its weekly program listings, despite those being 
otherwise distributed to competitors such as newspapers, magazines, 
distribution entities and TV guides. The broadcaster’s management or 
persons related to it apparently had not been pleased to find a critical article 
in the complaining publisher’s TV guide criticising them for certain 
business practices.95 
                                                 
92 Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Indenpendet Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v 
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As a result, they arbitrarily excluded that publisher from receiving their 
weekly program listings and asked distribution entities and other publishers 
to help them enforce the sanctions. This was an even more blatant and 
arbitrary abuse of copyright to the detriment of market participants.96 
 
4.2. The Microsoft Case ‘Saga’97 
 
There are many Microsoft Cases, as indicated by the media coverage that 
these received over the course of the last decades. For the purpose of this 
examination, only T-201/04, its follow-up T-167/06 and their related 
documents will be looked at. However, as this should not be yet another 
discussion of the Microsoft case, where not relevant for the broader 
analysis, facts, procedural steps or irrelevant findings of the judgement by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union will be left out. This goes 
especially for aspects of this case regarding the tying of Windows Media 
Player with the Windows Operating System. In any case, despite all the 
attention that the decision regarding tying of Windows Media Player or the 
case regarding tying of Internet Explorer got, the case examined here 
regarding interoperability information is much more important on a 
technical and legal level. 
 
4.2.1. Facts / Technical Background 
 
The technical background in this case revolved around the release of 
Windows 2000 and the introduction of new features relating to its use as a 
workgroup server system, connecting multiple client-side operating 
systems.98 One example for such a feature was the proprietary extension of 
the ‘Kerberos’ authentication standard. While there were limited licensing 
                                                 
96 ibid. p. 396-397. 
97 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding unter Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) (n 9).; Microsoft v Commission (n 9).; Microsoft v 
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agreements with certain competitors, those were not prolonged by 
Microsoft.99 
 
While there was some technical information and specifications available, 
these were deemed not sufficient by competitors and later on by the 
Commission and the European Courts as they related to older versions.100 
Even Microsoft did not argue against the point that for various differing 
computer systems or different software to work together, there always has to 
be some amount of interoperability between those systems.101 However, 
there was disagreement regarding the standard of interoperability 
required.102 
 
4.2.2. Procedural History 
 
This ‘saga’ started with a complaint to the Commission by Sun 
Microsystems regarding Microsoft’s dominant position in the supply of 
operating systems for personal computers on 10th December 1998 based on 
Article 3 of Regulation 17.103 Earlier, Sun had sent a letter to Microsoft 
requesting additional interoperability information.104 The reply by Microsoft 
indicated that it was not willing to cooperate in a manner that could achieve 
full interoperability, esp. as former licensing agreements for technology 
compatible with older versions of Windows were not renewed. E-Mails 
revealed during the investigation proved that this was intentional.105 
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In February 2000, the Commission finally and officially launched an 
investigation pertaining to the lack of interoperability for workgroup servers 
and the tying of Windows Media Player with the Windows Operating 
System.106 
In the end of 2001, the FSFE (Free Software Foundation Europe, an 
important institution for the European Open Source Community) asked for 
third party status in the proceedings, which was granted shortly afterwards. 
After also getting access to non-confidential documents from Microsoft, 
they comment on the discriminatory nature of the case towards Free and 
Open Source Software.107 
In the continuing investigation, in 2003 the Commission conducts a 
thorough market inquiry, the results of which can be found in Decision 
C(2004)900 final.108 In August 2003, the Samba Team (an open source 
project heavily impacted by Microsoft’s behaviour) submits a letter to the 
Commission why they cannot sign Microsoft licensing agreements requiring 
per-client royalty payments.109 In September of the same year, the FSFE 
tenders a submission to the Commission regarding the failure of a settlement 
that Microsoft reached with the US authorities to restart competition. The 
Samba Team proposes that the European Union authorities should force 
Microsoft to make its proprietary network protocol information and 
proprietary data formats available in a royalty free, non-discriminatory 
manner, similar to the still popular TCP/IP protocol that is used between 
computers connected to the Internet.110 
On the 24th of March 2004, the Commission releases its final decision up to 
this point, Decision C(2004)900 final. Microsoft is found to have created a 
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dominant position for itself, disrupting existing interoperability and then to 
have abused and exploited that dominant position.111 
On the 27th of May 2004, Microsoft outlines its compliance measures to 
comply with Decision C(2004)900. It committed to identifying all 
technologies necessary to comply with Article 1 of Decision C(2004)900 
and make specific required technologies available on a RAND (reasonable 
and non-discriminatory) basis.112 
In June 2004, Microsoft then appeals to the CFI (Court of First Instance) of 
the European Union (now the General Court), with one case to suspend the 
penalties imposed and another to annul Decision C(2004)900 as a whole.113 
On 27th of July 2004, FSFE again is allowed to take part in the proceedings 
for which it applied in June 2004. They again stress the importance of 
knowing about network protocols used and related specifications to 
establish interoperability.114 
On 22nd December 2004, the Court of First Instance dismisses the case for 
interim measures and orders Microsoft to comply with the earlier 
decision.115 
In 2005, specifically on the 10th of November, the Commission orders a 
periodic penalty against Microsoft for failing to comply as the 
Documentation prepared is ”neither accurate nor complete”. In addition, the 
rates charged for access and authorization to the information were found to 
be excessive. The penalty is later increased.116 
In the appeal on the merits, where FSFE was also allowed to intervene, it 
takes the view (together with Samba Team) that the offer to license only 
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parts of Windows’ source code is insufficient to comply with the earlier 
decision.117 
On 17th September 2009 Microsoft loses its appeal against the full case on 
the merits. The fine and the requirements regarding the interoperability 
information are upheld. The month after that, Microsoft announces its 
compliance with the ruling by the Court of First Instance. For commercial 
vendors, it asks for 0.4 % of patent licensing royalties and says it will not 
pursue patent royalties from individual or non-profit developers. However, 
there is still a one-time access fee of 10.000 EUR. The Commission is 
satisfied for now that Microsoft complies with its obligations of the decision 
from 2004118, but on the 27th of February 2008, the Commission sets an 
additional fine for failing to provide the interoperability information on 
RAND terms.119  
This fine is appealed on the 9th of May 2008.120 The FSFE, the Samba 
Team and additional companies with an interest in Free and Open Source 
Software intervene again.121 
On the 27th of June 2012, the General Court gives its ruling. The original 
decision is largely upheld. According to the Commission it is the first time 
that the General Court has ruled on a penalty payment that was imposed for 
non-compliance with an earlier decision.122  
Following the 2008 penalty payment decision Microsoft posted the 
interoperability information subject to the decision free of charge on its web 
site.123 
 
4.2.3. Findings by the Institutions 
 
                                                 
117 FSFE (n 107).; Microsoft v Commission (n 9). para. 282; Glorioso (n 13). p. 12-13. 
118 FSFE (n 107).; Hoehn and Lewis (n 13). p. 24. 
119 Commission Decision fixing the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment 
imposed on Microsoft Coporation by Decision C(2005)4420 final 27 February 2008, 
C(2008) 764 final (Commission of the European Communities). Rec. 280. 
120 Microsoft v Commission (n 9). para. 56. 
121 ibid. para. 57; FSFE (n 107). 
122 Microsoft v Commission (n 9). Article 1 and 2. European Commission, Antitrust: 
Commission welcomes General Court judgment in Microsoft compliance case 
(MEMO/12/500, 2012). 
123 FSFE (n 107). 
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4.2.3.1. Case by the Commission 
 
The case by the Commission went into significant detail to explain the 
technical nature of the matter, the results of the market inquiry and the 
finding of a dominant position and its abuses. 
As to the technical nature of the matter at hand, some explanation in that 
regard can be found above. Here it is important to note that Microsoft 
during its submissions even admitted that certain parts of its protocols 
developed for one or more of its Windows 2000 products were not 
documented or available for third party services on a non-Windows 
platform.124 Contrary to the Commission, it held that as the parts withheld 
were deeply entrenched within Windows 2000 and not an ‘interface’ by its 
definition, it was outside the scope of interoperability information that had 
to be provided or that interoperability was ‘good enough’.125 The 
Commission disagreed, especially as almost anything could be deeply 
embedded or included in an operating system. Other efforts by Microsoft 
were also not seen as solutions, sometimes they were even characterized as 
having the opposite goal, as was the case for ‘Unix Service for Windows’ 
which was seen as a tool to facilitate migration to a Windows environment, 
not to encourage interoperability or increase competition.126 
The Commission also explicitly held that Article 82 of the Treaty was 
infringed, as Microsoft was an undertaking within the meaning of Article 82 
and its conduct affected the whole of the Communities’ territories. As a 
result of that analysis, trade was held to be affected.127 
The Commission differentiated the market on the demand side in client-side 
operating systems, operating systems for other client appliances (such as 
phones) and server operating systems. The first were held not to be easily 
interchangeable, as substantial effort would have to be made and they 
normally used for entirely different purposes. On the supply side, there was 
                                                 
124 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding unter Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) (n 9). Rec. 217; Kühn and van Reenen (n 13). p. 12-13. 
125 ibid. p. 13. 
126 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding unter Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
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also deemed no substitutability, as small increases in price for example 
would not enable a competing software publisher to quickly write or switch 
to producing a client-side operating system because of high barriers of 
entry.128 Finally and crucially, the Commission identified Work-group 
server operating systems as a separate market, as they are neither as 
specialized as other servers, but also do not necessarily face such high 
barriers of entry as client side operating systems have. This was supported 
by evidence from the Commission’s market inquiry.129 This identification of 
the different markets was supported by the way in which different versions 
of Windows were marketed and priced as well.130 In the end, the 
Commission stressed the importance of interoperability for Work Group 
Server systems again.131 It also found no easy supply-side substitution for 
work-group operating systems.132 
The Commission also found that Microsoft’s market share for client-side 
operating systems was above 90 % and persistent for many years and the 
market share for work-group server operating systems was at least 60 %.133 
This, in conjunction with the network effects (high barriers to entry) that 
were present on the existing markets and the interrelationship between the 
markets brought the Commission to the conclusion that, similar to the 
Court’s established case law in Tetra Pak II, Microsoft had a dominant 
position within the meaning of Article 82 of the Treaty on the market for 
workgroup server operating systems.134 
When then assessing whether Microsoft also had abused its dominant 
position, the Commission based its reasoning first on the classification of 
Microsoft’s behaviour as a refusal to supply. The case law this is based on is 
                                                 
128 ibid. Rec. 342; Glorioso (n 13). p. 2. 
129 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding unter Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) (n 9). Rec. 349. 
130 ibid. Rec. 373. 
131 ibid. Rec. 386; Kalmo and Scopelliti (n 13). p. 3-5. 
132 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding unter Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) (n 9). Rec. 401. 
133 ibid. Rec. 431, 499; Kalmo and Scopelliti (n 13). p. 4. 
134 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding unter Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) (n 9). Rec. 544 & 742; Komninos and Czapracka (n 13). p. 
96. 
 35
long-standing, starting with Commercial Solvents135 (raw materials), 
Télémarketing136 (service), Magill137 (copyright protected program listings, 
see above). To each of Microsoft’s previous objections, the Commission 
methodically reiterates its reasoning, and clarifies apparent 
misunderstandings. Of main importance there were the fact that even if only 
the client-side market with over 90 % market share counts as dominant, 
pursuant to Tetra-Pak II this doesn’t matter for such interlinked markets. 
The refusal to supply was a refusal as there was previous supply and the 
refusal was not about having to allow copies of windows or a license to 
source code. In conjunction with the earlier case law mentioned, Microsoft’s 
conduct risked elimination of competition and foreclosure of the market 
(today it would be called lock-in effect, such as for mobile phones) and as 
such there was an abuse of the dominant position.138 
Adding to its analysis of an effect between member states, the Commission 
states that pursuant to United Brands it is irrelevant whether a case concerns 
trade between member states or trade on the markets of all member states by 
a company from a foreign state.139 
Most importantly, the Commission then ordered Microsoft to disclose 
relevant interoperability information as defined in Article 1 of the 
decision.140 
 
4.2.3.2. Case for interim measures141 
 
In this case, Microsoft sought to achieve interim relief pertaining to its 
obligation by the 2004 Commission decision to make the relevant 
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interoperability information as specified in Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the 
decision available. This application was however dismissed in its entirety.142 
Microsoft specifically tried to argue that its business policy would be 
irreparably harmed, its intellectual property irreparably infringed and 
competitors could from the information required not only produce 
interoperable systems but also copy its operating system and would do so.143 
Those points were not found to have been proven and had no resemblance to 
the facts, as proven by subsequent developments. 
 
4.2.3.3. Case on the merits144 
 
This constituted the main appeal on the merits in case T-204/01 pertaining 
to Commission Decision C(2004)900, either for annulment of the decision 
at issue or in the alternative a reduction or annulment of the fine. Notably, 
Microsoft was supported by certain industry associations and related 
companies, whereas the Commission’s position was supported by the Free 
Software Foundation Europe (FSFE), the European Committee for 
Interoperable Systems (ECIS) and others. The court was sitting as a grand 
chamber. 
In the decision, the court takes great care to describe the technical facts once 
more, mainly based on the decision of the Commission. The court 
furthermore finds no issue with the general categorization of the facts under 
Article 82 (now 102) of the Treaty.145 
Lengthy arguments were devoted to the issue of the intersection between the 
competition law remedy of the disclosure of certain information ordered by 
the Commission and the copyright that Microsoft owned in its own 
developments. It came down to the fact that the Commission had not said 
that its remedy had no relation to the defendant’s intellectual property, but 
that it was quite reasonable and that it had not ordered to disclose 
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everything, just the parts that were necessary for full interoperability and 
competition.146 
The definition of interoperability was again the subject of debate, as it was 
in the proceedings leading to the decision in 2004, despite the Commission 
and Microsoft agreeing that interoperability is a matter of degree.147 
Specifically, Microsoft wanted to base interoperability on the definition 
given in Article 6 of Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the 
legal protection of computer programs which it perceived to be narrower. 
However, Microsoft’s argument stayed too vague for the court, which finds 
the definition used in the 2004 Decision and that used in the Directive 
consistent.148 
Additionally, the court found the Commission’s approach of defining 
interoperability by reference to what was necessary to enable developers on 
non-Microsoft operating systems to produce a competing product and stay 
on the market well founded. It expressly stated that this approach was not 
open to dispute by reference to the special responsibility that a dominant 
position requires.149 
 
4.2.3.4. Case against the penalty payment for failure to comply150 
 
This case was brought by Microsoft, after the Commission had fined it again 
for failure to supply the interoperability information and to do so on 
reasonable terms. According to Commissioner for Competition at the time, 
Neelie Kroes, it was the first time a company was fined for the failure to 
comply with remedies imposed on it, “and hopefully the last.”151 The case 
ended with the court dismissing the case, except for a marginal reduction of 
the fine for a letter sent to Microsoft where DG Competition suggested that 
Microsoft could prevent distribution of software based on information 
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released due to the 2004 decision in source code form, while the appeal was 
pending.152 According to the Commission’s submission in the proceedings, 
the letter constituted an attempt to balance the interest of the parties.153 This 
would have prevented any free and open-source development, as due to the 
open model of development, source-code is in most cases always available, 
even during development. 
In particular, the court confirmed that without convincing evidence proving 
the innovative character of certain interoperability information, Microsoft’s 
remuneration schemes used until 22nd October 2007 were unreasonable.154 
Especially as the Commission characterised only 7 of the 173 protocols 
submitted as innovative to be contain actual innovation, as comparable 
alternatives to the others were offered royalty free.155 
Of particular importance was furthermore that the court also upheld the 
Commission’s approach of assessing the intrinsic value of a technology 
through market analysis instead of the strategic value.156 
 
4.2.4. Conclusion 
 
Business practices such as the one Microsoft was fined for in this saga of 
European Union Competition law are still pervasive in the technology 
industry, even if they do not always have the same impact.157 Even though 
they might often be legal under competition law because a company that 
carries them out is not in a dominant position, they still can create harm for 
consumers or businesses as it is hard to predict how a software product will 
develop or with what it will or will not be compatible down the road.158 If 
Microsoft would have adhered to an open-standard, this all could have been 
avoided, or if at least the Commission would have required licensing similar 
to an Open Standard from the start. Though it seems that Microsoft is at 
least somewhat more considerate today than it was in the past, it is possibly 
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still engaged in similar practices today, as will be explained in more detail 
below.159 
 
4.3. BSA v Ministry of Culture160 
 
This case, also referenced to a limited extent in Case C-406/10 SAS 
discussed below, can be seen as the European Union’s equivalent to the case 
Lotus v. Borland in the US. It also examined whether or how far the 
interface of a program is protected under copyright law, which in case of 
BSA was an implementation of Directive 91/250.161 Hence, as a precursor to 
some of the issues discussed in SAS, it is included here. 
 
4.3.1. Facts & Procedure 
 
The BSA (Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace) had tried to get a permit for 
the collective administration of copyrights in computer programs since 
2001, before the Czech republic joined the European Union.162 
Thereafter, there was a rejection decision by the responsible Ministry of 
Culture, legal appeal, followed by a second decision and finally a third 
decision in 2005 after the 2nd decision was automatically annulled when 
BSA objected. A further objection was dismissed on 6th June 2005. When 
BSA appealed that decision, BSA argued the definition of a computer 
program in Czech copyright law not only covers source code or object code, 
but also interfaces, as which it saw the user interface.163 This action was 
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dismissed and then appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, where 
BSA argued that every time a user interface is displayed by a screen, this 
constituted use of the program and as such this use should be protected.164 
The Supreme Administrative Court then decided to refer two questions to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union.165 
First, the referring court asked if Article 1 (2) of Directive 91/250166 should 
be interpreted as including, for the purpose of protection of ’the expression 
in any form of a computer program’, the user interface of a program. 
Secondly, the court asked, if television broadcast of that interface 
constituted making part of a work available to the public under Article 3 (1) 
of Directive 2001/29.167 
 
4.3.2. Findings by the court 
 
Regarding the first question, the court held that while the object of 
protection under Directive 91/250 is quite broad and can include such things 
as design work, the graphic user interface does not constitute an 
‘expression’ of the computer program within the meaning of the Directive. 
The main argument was that it does not constitute a part that could result in 
a functional program if displayed and is not sufficiently original.168 In 
holding so, it followed the Advocate General’s opinion. 
Then, although the referring court did not ask for this, the Court of Justic of 
the European Union held that even though the interface is not protected by 
Directive 91/250, depending on the extent of personal intellectual creation 
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that went into it, this could fall under the scope of the protection of 
Directive 2001/29.169 
The second question was then answered briefly in the negative. Although 
authors are given the right to control exclusive distribution of their work, the 
court held that a broadcast by television does not make a computer program 
public under Directive 2001/29, as it merely passively displays the interface, 
without interaction, one of the defining characteristics of computer 
programs being possible.170 
 
It can be observed, that especially for the subject matter, this whole decision 
is quite short, especially compared to other decisions in intellectual property 
law such as SAS. It might be, that the court did not want to waste too much 
time on this matter, as so far no other instances are known where an 
association of in the area of software tried to get the right to collectively 
administer copyrights for computer programs. 
It is not clear from the facts of the case brought before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union what the association’s plan would have been in 
particular, but on the questions referred to the court, the issue was related to 
the likeness of programs display on TV or other mediums.171 
Even if real programs would frequently be displayed on TV or in movies, it 
would seem, that except for documentaries or how-to videos, producers 
would rather use a made up interface than have to pay royalties for 
including a real program interface. Based on the facts given in the Court of 
Justice of the European Union’s judgement, this view that it was a rather 
useless endeavour was shared by the Czech Ministry of Culture and based 
on the briefness of the judgement maybe also Court of Justice.172  
The Ministry had already held on 27th of January 2005, that a computer 
program was protected mainly through protection of the source code and 
object code, whereas a graphical user interface could be protected by unfair 
competition law or, depending on the kind of creation (such as an image) 
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under general provisions as well, but not as a computer program.173 The 
Ministry also observed at that point, that while collective administration of 
copyrights for computer programs could be possible in theory, that there 
was no purpose to it and that mandatory collective administration was 
altogether not an option. This means that no enforcement gap exists, a view 
shared by legal commentaries, even if some of them take issue with the legal 
reasoning of the court.174 
 
4.3.3. Conclusion 
 
Seeing as most programs are sold through licensing agreements and without 
access to source or object code cannot be readily copied such as images or 
texts, the decisions by the Ministry and later the European Court of Justice 
seem logical. 
In the area of Open Source Software and alternative licensing, developers 
already face increasing hurdles through software patents and interoperability 
issues, so that a wholly different ruling in this case, redefining how far the 
expression of a computer program reaches could have meant an even 
broader protection for computer programs, with potentially unforeseeable 
consequences for SAS and future cases.175 
 
4.4. SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd.176 
 
The SAS case is a much more recent one than the Microsoft case and 
focuses on the copyright aspect of interoperability, not the supply of 
interoperability information by an undertaking in a dominant position as 
defined by competition law. 
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It is similar to an older case from the United States, where the issue was 
whether certain points of the graphical user interface such as menu items 
and structures were allowed to be similar for compatibility reasons. This and 
the compatibility of certain macros made it easier for users to switch. This 
was the case in Lotus v. Borland, which is seen as an important case by 
observers that defined the scope of software copyright.177 
 
4.4.1. Facts / Technical Background 
 
The SAS case was a case brought in the United Kingdom by the SAS 
Institute Inc., a developer of (business) analytics software against World 
Programming Ltd, developer of similar systems, for the “infringement of 
copyright in computer programs and manuals related to its computer 
database system”.178 
With this system, users can write scripts that they then run against their own 
data. These are written in a specialized language called ‘SAS language’. As 
WPL felt that there was a market for its own software with compatibility to 
the SAS system, it created the ‘World Programming System’ that can run 
scripts written for the SAS system with almost full interoperability.179 
Crucially, the High Court, which referred the case, held that as far as it was 
known, WPL had had no access to the source code of any SAS programs, or 
copied any of their parts. 
 
4.4.2. Procedural History180 
 
The case was brought before the English High Court on 14th September 
2009 and preliminary judgement was given on 23rd July 2010.181 In this 
judgment, certain questions were referred to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. Specifically, the High Court sought to confirm its 
                                                 
177 Lotus Development Corporation v. Borland International, Inc. (n 161). 
178 SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd. (n 10). Para. 2.  
179 ibid. Para. 23-24. 
180 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd. (n 10).; SAS Institute Inc. v World 
Programming Ltd. (n 10).; SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd (n 10). 
181 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd. (n 10). para. 1-7. 
 44
interpretation of the Computer Programs Directive whereas (1) 
implementing interoperability functionality in a program did not constitute a 
breach of copyright of the program it was made interoperable with 
(Questions 1-5) and (2) whether pursuant to Article 5 (3) of the Directive, 
acts done with a lawfully acquired program that fall outside of the scope of 
its license for the purposes of interoperability are permitted (Questions 6-7). 
Additionally, the High Court asked (3) if Article 2 (a) of Directive 2001/29 
should be interpreted in such a way that possible reproductions of the 
manual of one program in the manual for another program constitute an 
infringement (Questions 8-9).182 
On 2nd May 2012 the Court of Justice gave its answers to the questions, 
after which on 25th January 2013, the High Court gave its final 
judgement.183 
 
4.4.3. Findings 
 
In the following paragraphs, the answer to the reference questions given by 
the Court of Justice will be laid out. 
Regarding questions 1 to 5, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
essentially asks if under Article 1 (2) of Directive 91/250, not only the 
specific expression given to it, but also the general functionality of a 
computer program as well as the programming language developed for it 
and the format of its data files constitute the expression that is the object of 
protection.184 In Case C-393/09 BSA this court held that while the source 
code and object code of a program are always forms of expression of a 
program, the graphical user interface and the functionality is normally not 
protected by copyright, though the graphical user interface can be protected 
under unfair competition law.185 
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This is an incredibly important point for the freedom of creation, innovation 
but also competition, which the Advocate General put nicely in this case by 
saying: 
”[...] to accept that the functionality of a computer program can be 
protected by copyright would amount to making it possible to 
monopolise ideas, to the detriment of technological progress and 
industrial development.”186 
 
Moreover, as the court points out, that is precisely why it makes sense to 
protect software under copyright and not a special right or a different 
solution. Only the specific expression is protected, but ideas are not, so that 
authors can compete with similar programs, as long as they do not copy. 
Things would be different, if an author re-creating certain existing 
functionality would have access to parts of the source code. This was 
however not the case here.187 
The court also mentions that whether or not the programming language or 
data files are their author’s own intellectual creation and thus potentially 
protected under Directive 2001/29 does not matter in this regard. Thus, 
because on the facts, there was no access to source code, and no attempts to 
decompile188 the program were performed, for the purpose of the protection 
under Article 1 (2) of Directive 91/250, the programming language or the 
data format used are not an expression of the program per-se, and thus are 
not protected under the Directive.189 
As mentioned above, question six and seven then raised the question 
whether a user of a lawfully purchased program can observe, test or study 
the functionality of that program to learn about the ideas and principles 
behind it, or whether this can be prohibited by acceptance of the license that 
the use of the program entails.190 
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The court first holds that on the facts, it is established that the defendant in 
the main proceedings held valid licenses for the copies of the program that it 
evaluated.191 Pursuant to the High Court that referred the question, the 
defendant thus used the program in a way that was outside the scope of its 
license and subsequently would like to know whether the exception of 
Article 5 (3) of Directive 91/250 can be relied upon.192 
Here, the Court of Justice of the European Union then clarifies that pursuant 
to the wording, every licensee can freely observe, study or test a program he 
is allowed to use, to gather information about the ideas and principles the 
program is based on. Those ideas and principles are not protected by 
copyright on purpose, and this is hence consistent with the object of 
protection set out in Article 1(2) of the Directive. In addition, any license 
terms to that end are void, pursuant to Article 9 (1) of Directive 91/250. 
Both points mentioned above are also elucidated in recital 18 and 17 
respectively.193 
In case there would have been decompilation within the meaning of Article 
6 (2) (c) of Directive 91/250 things could have been different if the resulting 
program would be held to be ’substantially similar’ in its expression. This 
was however not the case, based on the facts.194 
As a result, the Court of Justice of the European Union answered those two 
question by stating that a person with a valid license for a computer program 
can, without further authorisation by the copyright owner, observe, test and 
study said program to determine its functionality, ideas and principles of 
any of its elements, such as protocols, data formats or programming 
languages, as long as the exclusive rights of the owner are not infringed.195 
 
By questions eight and nine, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
answers the questions of the lower court, to what extent the use or 
reproduction of certain elements of the manual of a computer program in 
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another computer program or the manual to it constitute an infringement 
under Article 2 (1) of Directive 2001/29.196 
To this end, the court states that as an expression of the intellectual creation, 
all parts of a work enjoy protection, pursuant to Case C-5/08 Infopaq 
International.197 Furthermore, it holds that while the singular parts that 
make up the syntax, commands, options, iterations, words, figures or 
mathematical concepts are not protected, when these are put together by an 
author in an express manner and make up the manual (the intellectual 
creation), they are protected.198 
Hence, the last two question are answered by saying that a reproduction of 
certain element of a manual in another manual or computer program can be 
an infringement as in Article 2 (a) of Directive 2001/29, if the reproduction 
is not an expression of the intellectual creation but of that of the other 
manual.199 
When the case went back to the High Court, it concluded exactly as before, 
finding only partial infringement for certain parts of the manual that were 
too similar but dismissing all other claims related to the data format or the 
language.200 In the process, it found any license terms to the contrary to be 
void. 
In the light of a focus on interoperability, the partial infringement could be 
considered problematic, especially when looking at the reasoning used.201 
While the judge comes to the conclusion that there was no intentional 
copying, and does not find the ’WPS Guides’ to be infringing, he holds part 
of the ’WPS manuals’ to be infringing, because some of the language is 
similar. There might be a reasonable argument because the writers admitted 
that they sometimes looked at the SAS manual while working. Still, similar 
language used can, especially when describing syntax that should have the 
same function, always be explained by the same or very similar 
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functionality being described, so that necessarily the same names, with the 
same options are described. 
 
4.4.4. Conclusion 
 
This case is of crucial importance for all businesses or individuals who 
create programs that require some degree of interoperability. Specifically 
open-source projects, but also proprietary products. 
In many cases, where under competition law a company is, based on 
freedom of contract, free to deny cooperation to create a compatible, 
interoperable product, from a consumer or business point of view, an 
interoperable product is still desirable or even indispensable.202 
If general concepts, ideas or their composition into a specialized 
programming language or data format would be covered by software 
copyright, this would preclude businesses or individuals from developing 
and distributing innovative software, without asking special permission. 
Examples for this are program libraries that access iTunes or iPod/iPhone 
database files or programs such as Libre Office that can edit Microsoft 
Office files, both without having access to the relevant source code, instead 
relying partly on specifications, but mostly on observing, testing and 
analysing the original program and data format.203 
This was and still is especially important for Free and Open Source 
Software. When free and open source software first came up, with the 
market share of Microsoft Windows on the client-side and small to medium 
servers, and alternate Unix vendors on small to big servers, it had a tough 
time. To gain any kind of interest beyond the purely enthusiast based crowd, 
Free and Open Source Software such as Linux or Samba (at issue in the 
Microsoft case) had to gain at least a minimal amount of compatible, 
interoperable functionality. Especially with many additional hurdles that can 
exist, such as patents, allowing copyright to extent to ideas, principle, 
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functionality, data formats or protocols would have been a terrible blow to 
interoperability.204 
 
4.5. Hispalinux complaint 
 
There was a tendency in popular literature to see the behaviour of Microsoft 
in the case discussed above as a thing of the past. That not only Microsoft 
but also most IT companies in general were more open today and did not 
use their market power to hinder interoperability or to foreclose the market 
as in the past. While it is true that most companies are not in such a 
dominant position as Microsoft was, and as such have much lower chance to 
successfully use a similar tactic, similar practices are still used today, mostly 
by Microsoft itself. 
 
4.5.1. Facts / Technical Background 
 
On March 26th 2013, the Spanish association of Linux users ‘Hispalinux’, 
brought a complaint against Microsoft to the Commission based on 
Microsoft’s introduction of ‘UEFI’ technology.205 
This is a replacement for the so far (and still) used ‘BIOS’206 system used in 
x86207 based personal computers (except Apple computers), that consists of 
the very first software that is initialized when a personal computer is started. 
This software initializes the hardware and devices that a personal computer 
is made up of or connected to and loads basic settings regarding these 
devices and is responsible for important low level constants such as the 
internal clock.208 
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So far, while the ‘BIOS’ system has been around for a long time without 
significant improvements, there are multiple competing implementations by 
different manufacturers. These are generally selected by an OEM 
manufacturer or the manufacturer of the mainboard, as that is where the chip 
that contains the ‘BIOS’ system is located. Independent of which 
implementation is used, the means by which operating systems or other 
pieces of software can communicate with the BIOS are well known by now 
and for the most part allow all operating systems equal access.209 
The UEFI system is now intended as a replacement for ‘BIOS’. This in 
itself is not a problem, however it also introduces a feature heavily pushed 
by Microsoft, called ‘Secure Boot’. This should create a trusted chain of 
code through a method called ‘signing’, where each piece of code that is 
executed has to be signed by a unique key that is controlled by Microsoft. It 
is envisioned so that in case a malicious program tries to infiltrate or replace 
a certain part in the chain of programs that are loaded when the computer 
starts up, it could not have a valid signature and the operating system could 
then detect this and either refuse execution or replace the infected part with 
a clean version. Whether it will be effective once it is widespread is up for 
debate.210 
As said above, this was heavily pushed by Microsoft and to achieve the 
‘Works with Windows 8’ certification that can be important in the market, 
manufacturers must make sure to have Secure Boot enabled by default, 
although at least for x86 compatible computers, Microsoft recommends that 
Secure Boot can be disabled or be put into ‘custom mode’.211 
As a result of this replacement, in a system where UEFI is used according to 
Microsoft’s specifications, there are two ways to run a non-Microsoft 
operating system on an x86 computer. One is to disable the secure boot 
function or set it to ‘custom mode’. It is however up to the manufacturer to 
                                                 
209 Vinje (n 14). p. 251-253; Jeremy Kerr, Matthew Garrett and James Bottomley, ‘UEFI 
Secure Boot Imact on Linux’ (Redhat, Canonical 28 October 2011) accessed 24 May 2013. 
p. 1-2. 
210 Hispalinux, ‘Amended verified complaint’ (Brussels 26 March 2013) HT.3591 accessed 
23 May 2013. p. 3; Kerr, Garrett and Bottomley (n 209). p. 207. 
211 Hispalinux (n 210). p. 4-5. 
 51
decide if, when or where this is possible. In addition to this, it is not possible 
to use the potential benefits of secure boot with this method.212 
The second method consists of using a small, minimal boot loader (shim) 
that was developed and signed, which then either loads unsigned code or 
signed code. When loading unsigned code this at least makes it possible for 
Linux users to use their systems almost as before, although it still is a 
significant burden especially for people who like to have full control over 
everything running on their system.213 
 
Hispalinux now complains about two things, which pertain mainly to users 
of free and open source software or other operating systems that are not 
from Microsoft. Namely, that the requirement that Secure Boot be enabled 
on OEM machines and on ARM machines is anti-competitive and 
obstructive. While it is true that in the meantime solutions have been 
derived that work to some extent, there can still be competitive issues, as the 
solutions currently available depend entirely on the goodwill of Microsoft or 
the manufacturers.214 
It should be observed that the market for client-side computer is despite the 
still existent dominance of Microsoft Windows not the same today as it was 
during the time of the Microsoft case. In addition, especially in the mobile 
space, similar practices are quite common. Still, in the computer market as a 
whole, no single manufacturer has the same market penetration or history as 
Microsoft, or would have had the power to dictate its rules to manufacturers 
of generic OEM computers or generic hardware.215 
 
So far, the Commission did not feel the need to take action on its own. 
Currently the complaint by Hispalinux is still under investigation by DG 
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Competition and DG Connect.216 On request, the Commission confirmed the 
complaint by the association, but did not want to comment any further. 
 
§5. Data points regarding interoperability/switching costs 
 
To illustrate the effects that network effects and associated switching costs 
can have in the ICT market, especially when it involves software, relevant 
data from six papers will be examined. These papers take different angles on 
the occurrence of network effects and the software market. 
 
In 2004, Bitzer posited a paper in which he analysed the competition 
between computer operating systems, with specific regard to the market 
entry of the open source operating system Linux on the market for server 
operating systems.217 He held, that normally, the software market tends to 
favour the emergence of natural monopolies, such as the IBM PC Bios, 
Intel’s x86 processor architecture or the Microsoft Windows operating 
system.218 
To then analyse what happens in case of a new market entrant, he used a 
Launhart-Hotelling model, though due to the mostly free availability of 
Linux instead of comparing price data he conducted a real world test. In the 
model, Windows and Linux were included but also other incumbents that 
produced variants of Unix compatible systems (of which Linux is one) and 
Apple OS X. This model showed that a key factor was heterogeneity, or 
lack thereof.219 As the old incumbents producing variants of Unix had little 
product heterogeneity compared to Linux and they all even supported 
Linux, it was easy for users to migrate to Linux.220 Heterogeneity is 
significant when compared to any versions of Windows for server however. 
Bitzer also included Mac OS X by Apple as benefitting from heterogeneity 
in the server operating system market, this however was misguided, as OS 
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X is also Unix compatible, being derived from BSD.221 While he would be 
right in regard to the desktop  market where heteorgenity between Linux or 
Windows and OS X is significant, in the server operating system market the 
factors that contribute to heterogeneity are less important, as evident by the 
fact that Apple no longer sells OS X server as a separate operating system 
and also discontinued its line of server hardware. Instead, the server 
components not already included with OS X 10.8 are sold as an add-on 
package for 19.99 $, down from 499 $ for a license to OSX  Server 10.6.222 
 
Hence, Bitzer concludes that long-run survival of proprietary products in 
head-to-head competition with free and open source software depends on 
heterogeneity.223 This result fits well to the non-consumer market that was 
surveyed, for consumer markets it would be too simple. 
Related to these results, Goode conducted a survey among the Australias’s 
top 500 publicly listed firms, to find out how many of them had heard of 
Free and Open Source software and subsequently considered it for their 
business.224 The results from the survey indicated that up to a third of 
respondents did decide against using Free and Open Source Software at 
least in part because switching from a commercial, proprietary platform 
would mean significant costs to achieve interoperability and certain past 
investments would be lost.225 Interestingly, certain respondents explicitly 
stated that they were already ‘committed’ to a certain proprietary solution, 
independent of the merits of other solutions.226 This could be an indication 
that even in a homogenous environment, when it comes to actual adoption 
of interoperable solutions, such as those using free and open source 
software, simple interoperability is not enough. Related to this, a paper by 
Lin in 2008 found that only because there often no direct licensing costs, 
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this is not enough for non-proprietary alternatives to be chosen.227 For this, 
according to his observations additional flexibility, performance and a 
favour for customization is necessary. This fits nicely with the results seen 
by Goode in 2005, as he also saw a difference depending on the size of the 
firm and thus the IT expertise it had on staff, as a firm that already employs 
experts that can work with Unix variants will be able to switch to a Unix 
based alternative much more easily.228 
More recently, Lanzi in 2009 presented a model describing competition in 
the market with regard to open source in a case where it is assumed that 
there is perfect software compatibility.229 Although this is of course a big 
assumption and unlikely to be true very often, it could be said that the 
situation has gotten better compared to the 90s and it can in any case be 
helpful to understand the dynamics of the software market. In his model, the 
market entry of free and open source software into a monopolistic software 
market can increase the quality of proprietary software through an imitative 
effect and decrease its price.230 In case of large network effects231 that create 
lock-in however, the price of proprietary software increases in this model. 
The same market conditions were also observed by Yu, due to the ‘durable’ 
nature of software and its interdependency, when analysing predatory 
pricing in the software market.232 
Hence, a shared model is likely to emerge, in the absence of too strong lock-
in effects. Additionally, Lanzi agrees that in cases of only partial 
interoperability or no interoperability at all, loss of data or costs for 
converting this data arise as additional switching costs. This can be either 
between proprietary software and free and open source software or different 
proprietary software.233 
As a result, Lanzi holds that even for users of proprietary software, market 
entry of free and open source software often has a positive effect. Unless 
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switching costs are too great, then these have a negative impact on new 
market entrants and can even increase the price of the incumbent 
software.234 
Lastly, an interesting study regarding the benefits of interoperability with 
special regard to open-source software was conducted by Hicks in 2007.235 
He observes that in the past compatibility was ensured mainly through 
industry-standards.236 In a world with more and more different platforms 
and devices, this is not enough anymore. This is especially relevant to free 
and open source software, as for free and open source products to get 
established in the market, they are dependent on the possibility of 
interoperability. Interoperability can however also be beneficial to 
traditional companies.237 Hicks gives the examples of Apple making iTunes 
compatible with Windows to drive adoption of the iPod, Sun’s development 
of the cross-platform compatible Java to oppose Microsoft’s dominance or 
IBM’s support of Linux after the failure of its operating system OS/2.238  
Taken together, the studies presented above present the economic 
underpinnings to the market structure in the software market. The resulting 
picture is very similar to the one found by the Commission during its 
investigation for the 2004 Decision against Microsoft and subjectively 
seems consistent with the current market structure.239 
While naturally this presents challenges to incumbents, the results of the 
studies and many companies that offer proprietary applications or services 
today on top of open source software show, that even in a case of perfect 
interoperability and zero fixed costs, not all market participants will chose 
the open source version, so that there is a place for both business models. 
 
§6. Analysis: importance of interoperability 
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At the inception of the intellectual property system, while an important part 
was the protection of creators and innovators and giving them an incentive 
to continue, an equally important part was ensuring that for the rights 
granted to creators, society in return received benefits such as society being 
able to obtain copies of the works or otherwise reap the benefits.240 In a 
world where lobby groups tend to push for ever-stronger copyright 
enforcement and longer protection, this balance is under stress. Most 
importantly, this also meant that ideas and processes cannot be protected. 
This is the basis for interoperability.241 
The importance of this becomes apparent when looking at the intersection of 
intellectual property law and competition law on the European Union level, 
especially in the ICT/software market. One example for this is the concept 
of interoperability. In the same way that copyright holders feel that it is 
harder for them to enforce their copyrights, it is easier and more tempting 
than ever to create non-interoperable networks then enforce a lock-in effect, 
which then can present competition law problems. 
 
The Magill case was the first significant case that dealt with the intersection 
of copyright and competition law on the European Union level.242 In this 
case, TV broadcasters in Ireland did not freely distribute weekly listings of 
their programs, forcing consumers to buy the broadcaster’s own publication 
if they wanted a weekly listing. The court held, that while in principle a 
copyright holder has every right to control the reproduction of its own data, 
this does not mean that copyright holders are immune to the rules of 
competition law. Not only were the defendants naturally the only suppliers 
of their data, but they objected to other entities using this information to 
produce a product that would compete with their own products. 
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The court thus held that as the defendants had a dominant position, 
segregated the market and were exercising their copyright in such a way that 
it was manifestly opposed to then Article 86.243 Crucially, the Court of 
Justice held the Commission was right in its finding, as the exercise of 
copyright did not serve the protection of copyright itself, but the protection 
of a business model detrimental to competition.244 
This was an important judgement, as it marked a point where the Court of 
Justice held that especially regarding data or text that was otherwise 
licensed and made available, copyright should not be used to segregate the 
market or distort competition. This was also followed in other countries, as 
can be seen by a case that followed shortly afterwards in Germany.245 
 
The Microsoft case saga then brought the case law concerning the 
intersection between intellectual property law and competition law directly 
to the software market. 
After the Commission’s investigation, it agreed with the complainant that 
Microsoft had unfairly abused its dominant position to introduce new 
proprietary extensions to previous protocols and interfaces, breaking 
interoperability and distorting the market.246 
While normally all inventors and copyright holders should be entitled to 
earn respect for their work, the lengthy proceedings spanning 14 years are a 
good example to give an example of a copyright holder trying everything to 
continue its abusive practices. This became obvious when it was claimed 
during the proceedings that only providing interface specifications would 
somehow compromise the source code of Microsoft Windows, allow 
competitors to imitate Windows or when almost none of the supposed 
innovations that Microsoft claimed the information it had to provide was 
based on, were characterised as actual innovations/inventions.247 It should 
be kept in mind, that this is not something the Commission just came up 
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with, most of the ‘ideas’ or concepts under analysis were actually based on 
older non-proprietary standards such as Kerberos and only slightly modified 
or if not, were not worth anything as equivalents were licensed in the 
marketplace on a royalty-free basis.248 Hence, as was held in the case, the 
value of these so-called innovations was not in their unique character or 
inventiveness, but their strategic value, which is not protected by copyright, 
so that in the sense that Microsoft’s intellectual property rights would still 
be infringed, this was justified under competition law.249 
This was an issue in the case much longer than it should have been, as not 
only Microsoft litigated for a prolonged time, but the Commission actually 
had at first not complained about Microsoft licensing the interoperability 
information on RAND terms. Shortly after giving Microsoft leeway due to 
the pending appeal, it objected to Microsoft’s action regarding the 
disclosure of information as the fee would have had to be paid on per-user 
basis.250 This would have been impossible to comply with for a free and 
open source project and the fact that a licence would have cost more than a 
copy of Windows 2000 with the functionality included. As such, acceptance 
of those terms would not only have made it impossible for the Samba Team 
to support the newer features but also made it impossible for any 
commercial entities to market a viable product.251 
Finally, especially when considering the technology market today, it seems 
that often companies try to get away with monopolistic behaviour, such as 
seen in the Microsoft case and there are a lot of incentives for it.252 This can 
take the form of a monopoly on one market being used to establish a 
monopoly or behaviour detrimental to competition on a second market, as 
was the case in the Microsoft case as well, where the Commission and the 
Court saw it as a Tertra Pak II situation.253 
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In the Microsoft case, Microsoft had claimed infringement of their 
intellectual property; however this was not a very convincing argument as it 
turned out.254 While there was a distinction as to what actually constituted 
an innovation and what did not, the answers regarding the scope of software 
copyright were thin, and they were easily dismissed. These findings, as 
presented above go well together with the economic models presented in §5. 
This is especially true for the market description of the software market, 
which tend to favour a monopolistic incumbent due to large network effects 
and the importance of interoperability to lower heterogeneity so that new 
market entrants, be they commercial or free and open source software, can 
emerge.255 
This changed however with the SAS case and its precursor BSA.256 
Both cases had in common that they dealt with the scope of software 
copyright pursuant to Directive 91/250. In BSA it was held that the image of 
a graphical interface of a computer program is not protected under the 
protection of Article 1 (2) of Directive 91/250, similar to the Lotus v. 
Borland case in the US.257 BSA however is a bit out of the ordinary, as it 
did not involve interoperability or litigation by a copyright holder, but an 
industry association that requested the authority to collect royalties for the 
reproduction of computer software interfaces on TV screens. As pointed out 
in the case before the Czech administration, for generic business 
applications such as file managers, word processors or accounting tools, this 
does not make much sense.258 Other works such as texts, audio recordings, 
images, movies or audio-visual creations are already protected separately 
and in case of imitation, a case can be brought under unfair competition law 
as well. In the questions before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
however, it came down to the scope of the expression of software protected 
under Article 1 (2). The court decided that the graphic user interface of a 
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program does not constitute part of the expression of that program, 
especially as there is no interactive part in a display on television.259 For the 
reasons given above there is also not gap in the protection of intellectual 
works. Instead, for compatibility and interoperability reasons, as in the US 
case Lotus v. Borland it is important for interoperability and compatibility in 
the technology world to allow similar graphical user interfaces and 
interoperable functionality, while avoiding imitation.260 
Even more important for defending the concept of interoperability and 
defining the scope of software protection under Directive 91/250 was the 
SAS case.261 It arose from a dispute between two software companies, 
developing business analytics software, where World Programming had 
enabled its new product entering the market with the ability to run scripts 
written for the incumbent product by SAS in its special programming 
language and also incorporated interoperability with SAS’ file format. This 
made it much easier for potential customers using SAS’ software to switch 
to its competitor, as they were able to use some or all of their files with the 
new product. Based on the findings of fact by the lower court, the defendant 
had had no access to source code or object code of SAS.262 
The referring high court sought answers from the Court of Justice of the 
European Union regarding the scope of software protection under Directive 
91/250, especially as to how far implementing functionality for 
interoperability purposes could be a breach of copyright, and in how far it 
mattered whether an otherwise lawfully licensed program was used in a way 
outside the scope of its license for the purpose of interoperability.263 
When stating the basic scope of copyright protection for software programs, 
the court referred to BSA mentioned above, but then expanded on it. As the 
referring court had already concluded before referring, the Court rightly 
concluded that as a matter of principle the functionality of a computer 
program is not protected by copyright.264 Because of this, the functionality 
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itself is not protected under Article 1 (2) of the Directive, as it does not 
qualify as an expression of the program. Furthermore, the court holds that 
all licenses users of a program have the right to ‘observer, study or test’ a 
program they use in line with Article 5, to gather information about how it 
works and this cannot be restricted by license terms pursuant to Article 9.265 
This includes the programming language and the data format. This is of 
particular importance for interoperability, as both programming languages 
and an accompanying data format present one of the core constructs of 
computer software. Thus, if these would be afforded special protection, a 
market participant with enough influence create a new language and data 
format or buy the rights to an existing one, and then proceed to lock out 
everyone else or force them to pay a heavy toll. The ruling also should not 
have come as a surprise, while although the wording of some of the Articles 
might not always be precise in its meaning, the recitals make it much clearer 
and already at the inception of the Directive in 1992, Vinje explained the 
scope of protection in consistence with the SAS ruling.266 
With the more popular programming languages, this is not even a question 
as the idea is normally that as many people use it as possible, which 
includes building alternative tools that use the language. One example of 
this is the popular ‘gcc’ compiler that was one of the first big projects of the 
free and open source movement, which implemented a free interpreter for 
the ‘C’ language  that then helped build Linux.267 While there exist different 
standards and a standards body, this is only so it can be easily ascertained 
which syntax and features are supported by a certain compiler or source 
code. 
A newer example of a language developed by a commercial company on its 
own is that of C#, which was developed in conjunction with a set of 
accompanying libraries (.NET) by Microsoft.268 For interoperability, open 
source developers and related companies then created ‘mono’ an 
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267 Brian W Kernighan and Dennis M Ritchie, The C Programming Language (Prentice-
Hall 1988). p. 10. 
268 Microsoft, ‘Microsoft .NET Framework’ (2013) <http://www.microsoft.com/net> 
accessed 24 May 2013. 
 62
implementation of .NET that could run on non-Microsoft operating systems 
such as Linux or Apple OS X.269 Similarly, Google also used the popularity 
of the Java language to its advantage when establishing the ‘Android’ 
operating system for mobile devices. For this, it also developed a new 
implementation of Java for Android.270 While the case was not entirely the 
same, when Oracle brought infringement proceedings against Google after 
acquiring the company that had originally developed Java and the 
accompanying interfaces and libraries, it was held that there was no 
infringement regarding the programming language and accompanying 
functionality.271 All these examples could have played out quite differently 
and stifled important innovations if the mere functionality of a program, a 
programming language or data formats were protected as software under 
Directive 91/250. While at least so far, regarding software and as far 
Directive 91/250 is concerned, the achievement of interoperability, is not 
impossible, it remains to be seen what will happen in the future. A particular 
concern are DRM tools, which due to their goal to prevent circumvention 
are often afforded special legislative protection, and are used more and more 
pervasively to control platforms and market or to censor. One example of 
this ‘Secure Boot’, part of the IBM Bios replacement UEFI.272 
To this end, there is currently a complaint against Microsoft before the 
Commision brought by the Hispalinux association as outlined before. As 
can be seen in Appendix A and B, DG Competition and Connect are 
investigating the complaint, but nothing else is known at this point. 
 
§7. Conclusion 
 
In the pages above, the concept of interoperability was examined from a 
variety of angles. It was shown that issues with regard to interoperability 
                                                 
269 Mono Project, ‘Mono .Net development framework’ (2013) <http://www.mono-
project.com/Main_Page> accessed 24 May 2013. 
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information could arise under competition law as well as under intellectual 
property law. In Magill it was held that competition law can impact 
intellectual property law. Most often, under competition law a public 
authority or a competitor will act against an undertaking, which it perceives 
to create unfair conditions in the market, such as in the Microsoft case. At 
least in this case, it also took a long time to litigate to the end. The time to 
get the relevant interoperability information released was not quite as long, 
but by the time that had happened, the only still relevant party was the 
Samba Project, developed as Free and Open Source Software. Nonetheless, 
this project is still around and put the information that was licensed to good 
use. The case was the first case on the EU level where in the area of 
software protection, a performance remedy was used as a sanction in 
competition law.  
On the other hand, claims under copyright law, will be used by firms who 
feel that the copyright in their software was infringed. Such a case as SAS is 
not very likely to occur often, as when it is found that there was no access to 
source or object code, it would be very hard or impossible to prove that 
there was any infringement. As has been explained in the analysis, this was 
a very important ruling to clarify that the programming language and data 
format are not in themselves protected by copyright. 
No matter what area of law a matter is examined under, based on the case 
law considered above and Directive 91/250, it can be deducted that 
interoperability information is an important concept recognized in the law of 
the European Union. It should however be pointed out, that despite the not 
too negative picture painted here, a lot of uncertainty remains for businesses 
and developers. This is especially so, when patents are taken into account or 
decompilation or reverse-engineering (special techniques for the analysis of 
software covered by Directive 91/250) has to be used, as it is quite hard to 
know when this is allowed and when not. Unfortunately, when developers 
or businesses then find out that someone believes they were not entitled to a 
certain analysis, it would likely be too late and they would have to just hope 
for the best and get a good lawyer. 
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As a result, while some safeguards to allow for interoperability have been 
built into Directive 91/250 and its national implementations, it should be 
ensured that this single digital market also takes special care to safeguard 
interoperability exemptions. So that free and open source software and 
competing software can continue to be interoperable or even expand 
interoperability, with less lock-in in a successful ‘single digital market’. 
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§8. Appendix A 
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